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Valdes* Is Fidel Castro about to fall? Academics, journalists and politicians have been asking
that question since 1959. It is a question for which there is really no answer. The best one can do
is look at the record, consider the past and the present, and make projections to form educated
guesses. One thing is certain: the record clearly demonstrates that previous US policies have
failed to produce the desired results. Since 1959, relations between the governments in Havana
and Washington have been characterized by conflict, confrontation, and misunderstanding. The
conflictive relationship has been compounded by the absence of full diplomatic and commercial
relations. However, the prolonged suspension of diplomatic and trade relations is not unusual in
US policy. For 17 years the US and the former Soviet Union did not have relations. Diplomatic and
commercial relations with the People's Republic of China took 24 years to normalize. Cuba has
a population of about 11 million people. Its economy is minuscule. No longer does anyone talk
seriously about Cuba posing a military threat to the US or to other countries in Latin America. Yet,
after 31 years without normal relations, Washington tenaciously clings to its policy. For all these
years, US policy toward Cuba has remained unchanged, with the exception of the Carter period.
However, the reasons used to justify the policy have varied. At one point it was said that Cuba had
to pay compensation for US property confiscated by the revolutionaries. On other occasions the US
said Cuba had to break its political and economic ties with the Soviet Union, or remove its troops
from foreign countries. But the monumental changes which have taken place around the globe
over the past few years have brought an end to the Cuban military presence abroad. The Soviet
Union no longer exists; the old arguments are dated. Now, Washington asserts that in order to
have normal economic and political relations with the US, Cuba must institute electoral democracy
and adopt a free market economy. Outside of Cuba, most people assume the Cuban government
cannot survive for long under the current circumstances. The island has little petroleum, no aid
from the former socialist bloc, and no resources to sustain a modern society. There is a chronic
lack of foreign exchange, and the country has no access to credit internationally. Certainly, 1993
promises to be the worst year the country has experienced since 1959 in terms of the economy. Cuba
will be literally forced to rely on its own resources. It is also assumed that as austerity increases,
dissatisfaction and opposition to the government will mount and eventually "Fidel will fall." How
this might come about, no one says. But a number of possibilities are being brandished in the exile
community and among think tanks: * Scenario 1: assassination. Fidel Castro is assassinated and
the revolutionaries fight one another over power. One possible outcome of this scenario is a US
intervention. Cuban history suggests that such an intervention would fuel the fires of nationalism.
Fidelismo would remain an essential element of Cuban politics for many years. * Scenario 2: military
coup. Fidel Castro is overthrown by members of his own military. But why should we believe that
the military would be more interested in bringing about "democratization" in Cuba than has been
the case elsewhere in Latin America? Even if it ushered in some changes, such as further opening
the Cuban economy, it seems likely that a military takeover would only wind up preserving at least
some authoritarian features. * Scenario 3: popular insurrection. Fidel Castro and his military are
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overthrown by a popular internal revolt. Such a scenario is farfetched, since there are no organized
armed groups in Cuba. Since the mid-1960s, all attempts to introduce paramilitary units onto the
island from abroad have ended in failure. Moreover, the current opposition forces are not preaching
armed insurrection. They are calling for a peaceful resolution of political differences. * Scenario 4:
palace coup. Fidel Castro and his inner circle are removed by those within the Cuban Communist
Party (PCC) who support a democratic opening. Although there are many in the PCC who would
welcome a political and economic opening, and who enjoy support among the population and mass
organizations, they are reluctant to act because they are convinced the political space to maneuver
is not available. These people are nationalists and they want to democratize while simultaneously
preserving positive features of the revolution. They are convinced that the US policy of hostility
and confrontation must end before they can do anything. * Scenario 5: permanent lingering. With
great difficulty, the Cuban government could survive. Priority will be given to food production, and
securing the four million tons of oil the country needs in order to function at a minimal level. In
the meantime, foreign capital will increasingly be allowed to invest in every sector of the economy.
Concessions will be made, possibly including the introduction of legalized gambling. None of the
scenarios mentioned above will contribute to the opening of Cuban society and politics. These
scenarios will instead produce bloodshed and suffering, to one degree or another. For several
reasons, the US policy of isolation, non-recognition and economic embargo should be reconsidered:
First, the US stands alone with its policy. No other country in the world has adopted the US position.
Mexico, Colombia and Brazil are increasing their economic ties with the island. Latin American
and European countries support dialogue, not isolation. Second, the policy suffers from a huge
and insurmountable gap between intent and ability. Although it is claimed that US policy seeks
peaceful democratization, the results have been the opposite. The existing policy might succeed
in creating more austerity, more deprivation. But these are not the conditions which promote
democratic openings. The logic of US policy is twisted: at the same time as the White House insists
on the establishment of a market economy in Cuba it makes it ever more difficult for businesses to
invest in the island. Third, recent historical evidence has shown that a different approach can be
successful. In the recent experiences of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the initiative
for economic reform and political openings (glasnost and perestroika) began within the ruling
communist parties. Moreover, the internal political openings began after relations with the US had
improved. In the Cuban case, in those few instances where relations with the US began to slowly
improve, domestic political openings followed. Even if we were to assume the improbable that after
three decades of failure, US policy were to suddenly produce results and the government in Havana
was violently overthrown the long term consequences for the Cuban people would be catastrophic.
For many, many years instability, fueled by nationalism, would consume the country. What should
be done? The US government should announce that, for humanitarian reasons, it is prepared to lift
the embargo on food and medicine. No conditions should be imposed on such a measure. However,
the White House should convey that it welcomes any sign of good will from Cuba. Washington
should then wait six months. During that period, the good offices of Mexico should be sought to
serve as mediator. If a political opening begins to occur within 12 months, the US should announce
the progressive lifting of the embargo on non-strategic goods, such as consumer items. If a pattern
of political opening becomes discernable, the embargo would be further lifted. The US could begin
issuing licenses to import those goods produced by the private sector such as tobacco and in those
areas where mixed enterprises have been established. At no point, however, should the US impose
its designs on Cuba. Cubans should determine the agenda, the pace, and the sequence of change.
In order for dramatic changes to occur in Cuba, it is necessary for the US to radically change its
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policy, creating the external space for internal politics. Once the hard liners in Cuba no longer have
a foreign threat at their command, real politics will start. Civil society will begin to reassert itself. In
the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton wrote: "Safety from external danger is the most powerful
director of national conduct. Even the most ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its
dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual danger, will
compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which
have a tendency to destroy civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing
to run the risk of being less free." Let us do away with the continual danger. Let us extend a hand.
We both need dialogue and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The US has nothing to lose from
doing so. And we all have much to gain. *The author is Director of the Latin America Data Base.

-- End --
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